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1369 
TO CONSIDER OR TO USE? CITATION TO 
FOREIGN AUTHORITY AND LEGAL 
AESTHETICS 
ANDREW JENSEN KERR* 
“We don’t use foreign or international law; we consider the ideas that 
are suggested by an international court of law.”1  
—Justice Sonia Sotomayor (April 2009) 
Rule 1.2 … ß – to consider but not use; a source for inspiration but 
without legal authority  
* * *  
In this essay I consider what it means to consider something. More 
directly, I consider how a judge might distinguish a source used for 
inspiration from a source used as legal authority. I wonder if Justice 
Sotomayor posits this line-drawing problem as a koan to would-be clerks. 
To my limited ken, the epistemological limits of the English language make 
it impossible to separate these concepts with precision. I argue that we 
should instead lobby Bluebook editors to create a new signal that can 
capture a heuristic of citing something for edifying or contextual value. This 
is not a purely pedantic or indulgent exercise.2 Rather this solution reflects 
a core motivation of lawyers and judges who cite to non-authoritative 
authority–that it is bricolage,3 ornamental,4 an aesthetic. We expect legal 
documents to look a certain way. Perhaps literary icons like First Circuit 
Judge Bruce Selya can get away with the no-citation opinion.5 For the rest 
 
 
 * Lecturer of Legal English, Georgetown University Law Center. I thank Almas Khan for her 
review of this essay. 
 1. Justice Sonia Sotomayor, Speech to A.C.L.U. of Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES VIDEO (June 11, 
2009), http://video.nytimes.com/video/2009/06/10/us/politics/1194840839480/speech-to-the-a-c-l-u-
of-puerto-rico.html (July 6, 2009) (cited by STEVEN GROVES, QUESTIONS FOR JUDGE SOTOMAYOR ON 
THE USE OF FOREIGN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (July 6, 2009), 
http://www.heritage.org/courts/report/questions-judge-sotomayor-the-use-foreign-and-international-
law).  
 2. For a perhaps more indulgent but surely more humorous exercise see Marc Lane Roark & 
Warren Emerson, Signals, SOC. SCI. RESEARCH NETWORK (Nov. 10, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2688685. 
 3. Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 57, 64 (2004) (citing Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE 
L.J. 1225, 1237–38, 1285–1306 (1999)). 
 4. Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 291, 292 
(2005).  
 5. See Levesque v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 832 F.2d 702 (1st Cir. 1987). [Consider a 
parenthetical explaining case’s relevance]See also Dan Slater, The Linguistic Talents of Judge Bruce 
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of us, there must be a reference to something. Whether it is M*A*S*H*,6 or 
rapper Biggie Smalls,7 or your own planted dissent or concurrence8 from a 
previous opinion, the reader expects your argument to have a provenance. 
Signals reify and concretize this visual need for citation, and at the same 
time congeal ineffable gradations of inference into discrete pictographic 
symbols with uniform meanings.  
I thus present the signal ß–or sharp S–in honor of the allterative 
resonance of Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s own name. She first articulated the 
nicety of this distinction at a 2009 conference in reference to the perennially 
debated topic of foreign authority in U.S. courts.9 According to Justice 
Sotomayor, judges possess the robotic ability to compartmentalize what 
they read or experience from what they think or feel. They can look at 
something without letting it inform them.10 This feels counter to current 
trends in constructivist theories of education. It also feels contrived.  
Per the American Society of International Law taxonomy of foreign 
authority in U.S. courts, looking at foreign materials can be “an aid to 
interpretation.”11 I agree with Justice Kagan’s quip that good ideas are 
defintionally good, whereever they might come from.12 And, as surveyed by 
Professors Calabresi & Zimdahl, foreign materials have been cited since the 
birth of the United States.13 Even Justice Rehnquist thought this practice 
was okay!14 But there is of course a lurking problem with the facile citation 
 
 
Selya, WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (Feb. 4, 2008), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/02/04/the-linguistic-talents-
of-judge-bruce-selya-2/ (surveying the rich vocabulary of Judge Selya). 
 6. Austen L. Parrish, Storm in a Teacup: The U.S. Supreme Court’s Use of Foreign Law, U. ILL. 
L. REV. 637, 655 (2007). 
 7. Melzer v. CNET Networks, Inc., 934 A.2d 912, 920 (Del. Ch. 2007). 
 8. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) (“These references show an emerging 
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their 
private lives in matters pertaining to sex. ‘[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases 
the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.’ County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 
857 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).”). 
 9. Sotomayor, supra note 1.  
 10. Id. 
 11. Am. Soc’y of Int’l Law, Uses of International Law in U.S. Courts, in BENCHBOOK ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW § I.C (Diane Marie Amann ed., 2014), www.asil.org/benchbook/uses.pdf. 
 12. See, e.g., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speech at the American University International 
Academy of Comparative Law: “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a 
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication (July 30, 2010), https://www.supremecourt. 
gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_08-02-10.  
 13. Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources 
of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 743 (2005). 
 14. Daniel A. Farber, The Supreme Court, the Law of Nations, and Citations of Foreign Law: The 
Lessons of History, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1335, 1340 (2007). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/10
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to foreign case law for non-authoritative value: the unexplained reference 
gives rise to conflicting interpretations. 
Professors Delahunty & Yoo confirm there is nothing wrong with citing 
foreign authority for the same reason one might cite a law review article.15 
However, law review articles are always and inherently persuasive 
materials. We don’t need extra in-text qualifications from a legal writer to 
remind us she is citing to Professor Sunstein as instructive guidance. 
Additional clarification would be read as superflous or amateur. A citation 
to a law review–with or without an accompanying Bluebook signal–reads 
as a “good idea that has been valorized by the submissions and editorial 
process of the academy.” 
However, the standalone citation to a foreign case is opaque. How are 
we to interpret the unexplained nod to, e.g., the European Court of Human 
Rights16–as having binding value on the court? As a manifestation of an 
interesting thought? As providing contrast or context for what we could 
choose to do here, but ultimately decide not to do?17Judges probably often 
consider and use foreign authority for multiple, perhaps contrary reasons. I 
exclude here one very specific kind of reference–when per conflict of laws 
analysis a foreign law must be applied. Use of foreign authority can be 
required when intepretating the Laws of Nations or a tort or contract dispute 
whose locus is abroad. Use of foreign authority is here analogous to use of 
another U.S. state’s law in diversity jurisdiction. 
But the caution that many judges exercise when approaching foreign 
authority also casts light on the hubris of those who do choose to enlist it. 
In his “Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law,” Matthew Wilson 
provides a catalog of tools to help hesitant judges use foreign law 
appropriately when needed.18 This situation is discrete from citation to 
foreign law as comparative insight. But it does expose the confidence of 
judges who do not sense this same humility when working with foreign 
materials.  
I offer instead a Bluebook-based solution for when lawyers or judges 
cite to foreign authority for the same reason they might cite to a dissenter or 
an academic–because the idea seems like a good one (Kagan) and they can’t 
find the same idea in a controlling majority opinion, and so they are 
 
 
 15. Delahunty & Yoo, supra note 4, at 295. 
 16. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 576 (2003). 
 17. See generally Rebecca Lefler, Note, A Comparison of Comparison: Use of Foreign Case Law 
As Persuasive Authority by the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Canada, and the 
High Court of Australia, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 165 (2001). 
 18. Matthew J. Wilson, Demystifying the Determination of Foreign Law in U.S. Courts: Opening 
the Door to a Greater Global Understanding, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 887 (2011). 
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encouraged to look elsewhere for reference to this good idea to provide 
legitimacy for their position–even if the cite is only an aesthetic cover or 
anodyne for the expectant reader. Justice Thomas reminded Justice Breyer 
that Breyer was citing to a Zimbabwe opinion in Knight v. Florida, not 
because that court is necessarily held in high prestige or because Zimbabwe 
shares a modality of juridical reasoning or process, but simply because it 
was there.19 It was an act of both opportunity and desperation20: “I want to 
do this thing; I have to think of some reason for it. I have to write something 
that–you know, that sounds like a lawyer. I have to cite something. . . . what 
am I going to use?”21 
* * * 
We might ask if this opportunistic posture frames the process of case 
selection in all of common law method. An important contribution of the 
Legal Realists is their revised description of how judicial work gets done. 
The judge is not deducing the most pellucid syllogism from a full & 
complete data set of precedent, which itself represents the arc of natural law 
to progress, generality, granularity, efficiency, fairness, intelligibility, etc. 
Instead a variable as prosaic as what the judge ate for breakfast22 might 
inform her gestalt for the case, and encourage her to pick and choose case 
law that supports this inclination, while distinguishing as inapprapos or 
dated those precedents that clash with her intuition. In short, case selection 
is subjective and purposive even in domestic law. It inheres the same 
motivation as Breyer’s Zimbabwe case, but it is masked by the familiarity 
of a local jurisdiction. 
Stare decsis exerts a centripital force that anchors the evolution of the 
common law, and the Herculean judge is asked to fit her reasoning within 
its compass (Dworkin). But “[s]tare decisis is not an inexorable 
command.”23 We may reject the obsolete precedent, because of mere 
desuetude or because there is something patently wrong or icky about it that 
offends contemporary sensibilities. This way of thinking about common law 
lawyering is now so ubiquitous that it functions as a shared presumption. 
 
 
 19. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 459, 459 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring) (mem.). 
 20. The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases: A Conversation 
Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519, 528 (2005). 
 21. Id. at 531. See also Emily Bazelon, What Would Zimbabwe Do?, THE ATLANTIC, Nov. 2005, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2005/11/what-would-zimbabwe-do/304298/. 
 22. See, e.g., Mark DeAngelis, Legal Realism: The Law Depends on What the Judge Had for 
Breakfast, LEGAL STUDIES CLASSROOM BLOG (Oct. 14, 2013) (citing JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON 
TRIAL 162 (1973)), http://legalstudiesclassroom.blogspot.com/2013/10/legal-realism-law-depends-on-
what-judge.html.  
 23. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828 (1991). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/10
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Lawyers are evaluated on their ability to select wise precedent. It is what we 
call good judgment.  
In the domestic context we share these assumptions about case selection. 
But the citation to foreign authority obfuscates judicial intent by conflating 
edification and use. My proposed ß signal prevents the opportunistic judge 
from feigning the ediying cite, while actually making a pretextual use 
reference. The subterfuge is accessible, and is well-demostrated by my own 
familial banter. My wife is particularly skilled at cloaking the veiled 
criticism within the aura of a joke, where I am put in the conflicted position 
of either being a bad sport (it was only a joke, Andrew!) or obtuse (no, 
really, quit wearing that garish windbreaker24). My wife’s comment is 
meant to be interpreted as instrumental, but her charm and diplomatic 
disposition requires her to frame it with humor. My instinct is many judges 
also furtively want the reader to intepret the opaque citation to foreign 
materials for both edification and authority. The instrumental use value 
might not be immediate, but over time the opportunistic lawyer or judge of 
the future will re-frame it as authoritative. 
Professor Parrish instead argues transparency should be a cardinal 
ambition of U.S. courts, and encourages judges to be candid about what they 
read and how it informs their decision-making.25 Justice Breyer relays the 
anecdote of the congressperson who condoned Breyer’s study of foreign 
materials so long as he did not publicly disclose this inspiration in his 
opinions.26 I share this legislator’s concern of the unqualified reference 
being misconstrued by readers. But opacity is not a solution. And thus the 
ß: it contributes to the social knowledge project of The Common Law while 
also insulating Justice Breyer’s summer reading list from the legal canon. 
Perhaps the public might also find the Supreme Court of Canada27 to be 
good beach reading, and appreciate the tip. 
Apprarently jurists from many other nations do. Justice Ginsburg 
laments the declining cite counts to the U.S. Supreme Court, while noting 
that the Supreme Court of Canada has become more a hub or node for 
cutting-edge judicial work.28 This meta-conversation with other courts is of 
course secondary to the primary job description of a high court judge: to 
 
 
 24. But it is hypercolor and my mom bought it for me at a 90% discount from Filene’s Basement! 
 25. Parrish, supra note 6, at 674. 
 26. A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, supra note 20, at 
522–23. 
 27. See id. at 528. 
 28. E.g., Adam Liptak, Ginsburg Shares Views on Influence of Foreign Law on Her Court, and 
Vice Versa, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/12/us/12ginsburg. 
html?_r=0.  
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pick a winner and provide a reasoned ratio decidendi to guide lower courts. 
But to the extent that Justice Ginsburg’s goal is a valid one the ß allows the 
author to share good ideas within the spirit of good will. Diluted signals 
such as see, e.g., and cf. capture a reduced quantum of necessity or 
relevance, but they also connote that a court should recognize an illustrative 
example or analogous argument as at least somewhat persuasive. The ß 
lacks this same didactic thrust. It is not telling the reader to think a certain 
way; it is just letting the reader know a certain way of thinking exists. 
And the ß does so with the effortless modesty of a “below the line” 
pictograph.Judges and lawyers alike should loathe having to insert 
additional qualifications in the text of their writing. Prolixity interrupts flow, 
and periphrasis can create logical confusion. Why require an author to 
disclaim their citation to a foreign court with in-text phrasing like “I cite to 
X only to suggest this as a possible direction for this court to go; however, 
I instead select the nuanced position Y” when this labored point can be 
expressed efficiently in a footnote? We welcome flair below the line. The 
excursive footnote that points the reader to additional conversation on a 
point of law reflects our metaphor of scholarship as an ongoing 
coversation.29 See generally is too generic for the direct foreign authority 
citation. See also is good advice for checking out further literature on a 
debated point. But what if there is only one relevant citation and it comes 
from Zimbabwe? There is not the conditional prior thing to then have the 
paired also. In that case we require a separate signal to share our erudition 
with the world. 
I look forward to the diverse and thoughtful ways the ß might be 
employed. Besides making judges more accountable, it can also help inform 
their legacies by making their individual jurisprudences more defined. One 
judge’s See might be another judge’s ß. For example, Justice Thomas might 
cite to an eighteenth century opinion from the English Court of Chancery as 
authoritative, whereas Justice Breyer might use the ß to indicate its merely 
edifying nature. The reverse would likely be true for a reference to a 
contemporary opinion from a nation that possesses kin liberal-democratic-
post-capitalist values. 
I am aware my proposal might feel a bit heady and abstruse for 
something as seemingly mundane as a footnote. But I parry that my 
ambitions are immediate and pragmatic. Much has been written about the 
consideration & use of foreign materials, but the eristic debate continues. I 
 
 
 29. Cf. Joan Ames Magat, Bottomheavy: Legal Footnotes, 60 J. LEGAL EDUC. 65, 74–77 (2010) 
(surveying the explanatory footnote). See also Kenneth Burke.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol94/iss5/10
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seek to end it here. Well-meaning scholars have supported the use of foreign 
authority so long as it contextualized and done well.30 But this prescription 
is platitudinous. One could make the same “do it well” argument for any 
human adventure, and could make the same “cite it appropriately” 
instruction for any kind of academic work. The fact that lawyers are a 
particularly opportunistic bunch (see the regular citation to unpublished 
opinions31) increases the need for a less subjective test. Choosing the 
authoritative signal over the ß requires volition, and thus puts the calculating 
lawyer or judge in a tougher spot. I am however confident that–like Justice 
Breyer’s mention of Zimbabwe–most jurists will view the ß not as an 
obstacle but as an opportunity. Perhaps Justice Thomas might even be 
inspired to provide comparative insight to his own singular form of 
originalism. Please contact your local Bluebook editor to remind them of 
this important omission.32 Let’s save the ß33 and put an end to this sophistic 
attempt to articulate a test for considering useful foreign materials.  
 
 
 30. See, e.g., Stephen Yeazell, When and How U.S. Courts Should Cite Foreign Law, 26 CONST. 
COMMENT. 59, 70–71 (2009) (“International law, if it is to be used, should be used well–not as an 
ornament or afterthought. . . . [T]he point is simple: ‘good’ citation of foreign law will have the same 
characteristics as good citation of domestic law; they will be complete, careful, and contextualized.”). 
 31. See generally Martha Dragich Pearson, Citation of Unpublished Opinions as Precedent, 55 
HASTINGS L.J. 1235 (2004).  
 32. Contacting Us, THE BLUEBOOK (last visited Nov. 17, 2016), https://www.legal 
bluebook.com/Public/ContactUs.aspx (“If you have feedback or notice errors or omissions in Bluebook 
content or on The Bluebook Online site, please contact us at editor@legalbluebook.com.”).  
 33. E.g., Hyde Flippo, Spelling Reform: Double-s Words - German Language – Eszett, ABOUT 
EDUCATION (Aug. 3, 2016) (describing controversy over German spelling reform and “possible demise” 
of the ß), http://german.about.com/od/vocabulary/fl/Spelling-Reform-Double-s-Words-German-
Language-Eszett.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2016). 
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